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AbstrACt
Objective To assess developments over time in the 
capture, curation and use of quality and safety information 
in managing hospital services.
setting Four acute National Health Service hospitals in 
England.
Participants 111.5 hours of observation of hospital 
board and directorate meetings, and 72 hours of ward 
observations. 86 interviews with board level and middle 
managers and with ward managers and staff.
results There were substantial improvements in the 
quantity and quality of data produced for boards and 
middle managers between 2013 and 2016, starting from 
a low base. All four hospitals deployed data warehouses, 
repositories where datasets from otherwise disparate 
departmental systems could be managed. Three of them 
deployed real-time ward management systems, which 
were used extensively by nurses and other staff.
Conclusions The indings, particularly relating to the 
deployment of real-time ward management systems, are 
a corrective to the many negative accounts of information 
technology implementations. The hospital information 
infrastructures were elements in a wider move, away 
from a reliance on individual professionals exercising 
judgements and towards team-based and data-driven 
approaches to the active management of risks. They 
were not, though, using their ine-grained data to develop 
ultrasafe working practices.
bACkgrOund 
A series of reports published since the turn 
of the millenium has highlighted problems 
with the quality and safety of acute hospital 
services in many countries.1–3 While there 
is evidence of improvements in focused 
initiatives, it is generally agreed that there 
is considerable scope to provide higher 
quality and safer services overall.4,5 The prob-
lems have generated a range of proposed 
responses over the last 15 years. A recurring 
theme concerns the need for cultural change 
in hospitals, away from a ‘blame culture’ and 
towards one where staff have the confidence 
to report mistakes and are able to learn from 
them.6 Our interest in this article is in another 
long-standing proposal, investments in infor-
mation technology (IT) infrastructures, to 
facilitate the capture, analysis and use of data 
about the quality and safety of services.7–9 
In any hospital, implementing the proposal 
involves substantial changes in working prac-
tices. Staff in wards and departments will 
capture data electronically rather than on 
paper. Hospitals need staff with the skills 
needed to design and deploy IT systems, 
to manage and interpret clinical data and 
to support clinical teams in data-driven 
improvement initiatives. In practice, this is 
a considerable challenge. Many IT invest-
ments, including the high profile HITECH 
programme in the USA and the National 
Health Service (NHS) National Programme 
for IT in England, have experienced prob-
lems with both implementation and routine 
use in wards and departments.10 11 There 
is also evidence that hospitals can lack the 
capacity to analyse or learn from quality and 
safety data that are captured in wards and 
departments.12 For every leading site, there 
are others that still face challenges.13
This evidence notwithstanding, hospitals in 
the NHS in England have continued to invest 
in IT systems, including real-time systems—
where data are widely available as soon as they 
are captured—for managing wards. They 
have also sought to improve the volume and 
scope of data to support more effective gover-
nance of services, prompted by a series of 
policies and reports from 2008 onwards.14 15 
We studied the development of data and IT 
infrastructures at four acute NHS hospitals 
in England for the period 2013–2016. We 
strengths and limitations of this study
 Ź There have been very few studies that focus on the 
production of information and its use in managing 
hospital services.
 Ź This was an in-depth comparative study of the pro-
duction and use of information in four hospitals, 
employing observations, interviews and document 
analysis.
 Ź The study design did not allow us to evaluate the 
effects of developments on patient outcomes.
 Ź The study was only able to capture developments 
over a limited period: further studies would shed 
light on the development of information infrastruc-
tures over time.
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were particularly interested in whether and how they 
influenced the management of patients’ risks. Vincent 
and Amalberti16 describe three principal approaches. 
The first is based on a reliance on the judgements of 
individual health professionals, responding to risks as 
they arise. The second reflects a shift to team-based 
working, where teams proactively manage patients’ risks. 
In the third approach, which resonates with some quality 
improvement methods, hospitals use data to analyse their 
working practices and ‘design out’ risks, thus creating 
ultrasafe environments.
The article addresses two questions. First, how do hospi-
tals develop information infrastructures for capturing 
and using data about the quality and safety of services? 
Second, how do they use the resulting data to monitor 
and manage quality and safety? We conclude that acute 
hospitals are developing effective infrastructures, both 
for the real-time management of wards and for manage-
ment oversight of quality and safety. This is part of a wider 
transition, away from a reliance on individual doctors 
and other professionals relying on their judgements and 
towards a model where clinical teams actively manage 
risks.
MethOds
We used the Biography of Artefacts approach.17 IT 
systems in organisations develop over many years, typi-
cally in piecemeal fashion. New functions are added 
periodically and linked to existing systems, so that infra-
structures—amalgams of a number of systems and the 
working practices of the people who use them—develop 
over time. New systems are added incrementally; users 
can adapt to them over long periods and become deeply 
embedded in the day-to-day work of an organisation. If 
we want to understand why systems are used in the ways 
they are today, then we need to understand their histo-
ries. Furthermore, because these infrastructures develop 
in different ways in different parts of an organisation, it 
is necessary to study them over time and in more than 
one place—where changes of interest are likely to occur. 
Observations are used, in multisite longitudinal case 
studies, to build up a picture of the ways in which the 
infrastructure and the wider organisation adapt to one 
another over time.
Fieldwork was undertaken in four acute NHS hospi-
tals, each given a pseudonym to promote anonymity: 
Solo, Duo, Trio and Quartet. The sites were identified 
and recruited via a telephone survey of 15 acute hospi-
tals undertaken in the autumn of 2014. Sampling was 
both purposive and pragmatic. It was purposive in that 
we sought to recruit hospitals that had deployed real-time 
ward information systems or had formal plans to imple-
ment them. It was pragmatic because we could only select 
from sites that were included in the survey, all of which 
were within reasonable travelling distance of our research 
base and that were willing to participate.
In line with established ethnographic methods, we 
attached particular weight to direct observation of partic-
ipants’ working practices.18 19 Board level quality meet-
ings and directorate meetings were observed at all four 
sites between May 2015 and July 2016 (see table 1). At all 
meetings, a team member took contemporaneous notes, 
which were written up as soon as practicable afterwards. 
We also undertook semistructured face-to-face interviews, 
between April 2015 and September 2016, to explore the 
views of senior and directorate managers, and members 
of informatics and information teams, about the devel-
opment and use of information infrastructures in their 
hospitals, including developments in the 2 years before 
2015 (see table 2).20–22
Patient and public involvement
The study had a patient and public involvement panel, 
which provided advice on aspects of our fieldwork 
methods and commented on the findings and their inter-
pretation. They were not involved in recruitment or the 
conduct of the study.
Hospital board meetings were held monthly: papers 
were analysed for every third month (April, July, October 
and January) during the period April 2013–October 2016 
to establish trends in the volume and content of quality 
and safety data provided. Data on mortality, reported 
incidents and complaints, vital signs, pain management, 
nutritional status and the NHS Safety Thermometer were 
used as tracers.21
Table 1 Observations of meetings by site (hours)
Fieldwork 
observations 
(hours) Solo Duo Trio Quartet Total
Board-level quality 
meetings
18.5 23 18 22.5 82
Directorate 
meetings
16.5 3 0 10 29.5
Ward working 
practices
13 22 17.5 19.5 72
Total 48 48 35.5 52 183.5
Table 2 Interviews conducted by site/agency
Interviews 
(numbers) Solo Duo Trio Quartet Total
Senior 
managers
4 5 6 5 20
Directorate 
managers
2 1 1 2 6
Informatics 
staff
2 5 10 6 23
Ward staff 8 10 10 9 37
Total 86
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Observations were also undertaken on two wards in 
each hospital. Morning handover meetings, and the 
subsequent use of electronic whiteboards in the 30–60 min 
after the meetings, were observed regularly during the 
fieldwork period. (The electronic whiteboards were 
large screens, typically mounted on walls near a nurses’ 
station and showing summary details for each patient.) 
Detailed contemporaneous notes of staff practices were 
taken, focusing particularly on the use of whiteboards, 
these being outward manifestations of the information 
infrastructures at ward level. We were also interested in 
the sources of, and use of, information more generally, 
including ‘soft intelligence’ discussed during handovers. 
In addition, observers occasionally asked staff to explain 
their actions ‘on the spot’ when it seemed to be important 
for the study, for example, why a handover meeting had 
spent so long on a particular topic. Semistructured inter-
views were undertaken with ward clinical managers and 
staff.
Five cross-site accounts—mini-biographies—were 
developed of the work of board quality committees, infor-
mation and informatics teams, directorates (sometimes 
also referred to as clinical or business units) and ward 
teams (focusing on nursing staff but including junior 
doctors and consultants). The analytical strategy was 
ethnographic. Data from direct observations were used to 
develop initial timelines for each setting in each hospital. 
Open coding of interview transcripts was undertaken, 
and the coded material was used to develop the narra-
tive accounts.23 The accounts were then compared and 
contrasted with one another and integrated to provide 
overall narratives for each setting.
results
The overall trend in developments within hospitals was 
towards integrated technology infrastructures or, rather, 
two parallel and loosely coupled infrastructures.24 The 
first involved the deployment of real-time ward manage-
ment systems. These were either developed as discrete 
systems and then progressively linked to other systems 
(Trio) or were components of electronic health records 
programmes (Solo and Duo). The second development 
focused on data warehouses. These were computer 
servers that held a range of datasets derived from ‘live’ 
systems, including the newly deployed real-time systems, 
along with patient administration systems, pathology and 
other departmental systems. The warehouses were contin-
uously updated—every 15 min up to daily, depending on 
the systems involved—but were separate from the systems 
used ‘live’ in wards and departments. They were used to 
curate data, including validation of datasets, preparation 
of routine reports and the creation of off-one reports for 
quality and other committees.
real-time ward management systems
Quartet did not deploy systems in the period of the study. 
The other three hospitals deployed them successfully. In 
all three, they were designed collaboratively, principally 
by local informatics teams and ward nurses, with medical 
staff less directly involved. The design process was itera-
tive—some interviewees described it as agile—with infor-
matics teams producing versions for ‘pilot’ use, which 
ward staff fed back on, leading to design modifications 
until staff were happy with the systems.
Once deployed, junior doctors, nurses and healthcare 
assistants (HCAs) used tablets or laptops to capture data 
by the bedside. Some of the data were common across the 
three hospitals, notably nursing observations, which were 
used to calculate National Early Warning Scores (NEWS) 
scores automatically.25 All three were able to programme 
alerts for future nursing tasks, such as the next set of 
observations or the next risk assessment. Junior doctors 
used devices to view clinical data, including the results of 
tests and scans.
Broadly, clinical staff were positive about tablets and 
laptops. For example, at Duo, a nurse and a junior doctor 
respectively told us:
If we were to take a phone call, we can update on 
here any information immediately so it’s straight on 
the whiteboards, the doctors can see straight away, all 
of the team can see, and if we’re asked any questions 
we’ve got all the information available. (Duo, ward 
nurse)
If I need to check something I’m not having to go 
down to the doctor’s office [and] go through the doc-
tor’s notes, everything’s on here so I know for exam-
ple if they’ve been for a test. (Duo, junior doctor)
However, some problems were noted. One was that 
there were too few devices on some wards. Another 
concerned the difficulties experienced when the system 
crashed. The system did not go down often, or for very 
long, but there were problems when it did:
If that screen goes down you can’t see when your pa-
tient’s obs [observations] are due, what they were be-
fore, or anything. (Trio, ward nurse)
Electronic whiteboards, located in or near ward 
stations, were used throughout the observation period to 
view ward-wide data ‘at a glance’ at Duo and Trio. Nurses, 
HCAs and doctors used them to check when patients’ 
observations were next due and to check the locations 
of patients when they came onto the ward. A ward sister 
observed that:
You’ve got this huge thing telling you … it’s just eas-
ier to see, it’s so much clearer…you can see people’s 
blood pressure dropping … we’re just more aware, I 
just think it’s really good. (Trio, ward sister)
There were no substantive changes in use during the 
observation period. In contrast, clinicians at Solo told 
us that staff did not look at the whiteboard very often, 
because most of the data (eg, NEWS, risk of fall and nutri-
tion) were duplicated on their laptops and on handover 
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sheets, which were used before the arrival of electronic 
whiteboards. Quartet used wall-mounted dry-wipe white-
boards throughout the study. Their use, principally for 
identifying key clinical risks for each patient, using 
magnet symbols, of did not change.
nursing handovers and other meetings
The real-time systems were designed and deployed in 
the broader contexts of information-intensive processes 
on wards. Working practices, notably in handovers and 
patient safety huddles, were stable over the course of the 
study: we did not find evidence that the technologies 
disrupted clinical work. Across the four hospitals, similar 
data were used in handovers and huddles throughout the 
period of observation. At Solo, for example, throughout 
the study, nurses starting their shift had a printed paper 
handover sheet, which included summary patient history 
details, dietary information, patient assessments (eg, falls 
risks), current medications and NEWS. Staff also discussed 
information that was not available on the handover sheets, 
such as jobs needing to be done (eg, changing dressings) 
or how a patient was feeling (eg, a patient’s scores were 
fine but he had reported that he did not feel well).
development of routine data infrastructures
There had been substantive developments in infrastruc-
tures for handling routine data at all four hospitals, which 
they reported as having commenced in 2011 or 2012. 
Interviewees pointed out that hospitals had captured and 
submitted substantial volumes of data to national bodies 
since the 1980s; they repurposed some of these data for 
use in internal management reports. The changes were 
reflected in developments in the scale and scope of 
data reported board quality committees. In April 2013, 
three of the four board-level quality committees received 
reports presenting trends in a limited number of routine 
data items on 1–2 sides of paper. The report at Trio was 
longer, at over 30 pages, presenting trends in a larger 
number of indicators. By October 2016, all four hospitals 
presented detailed reports, presenting large numbers of 
indicators, typically on 60–100 pages, with many dozens of 
graphs, charts and tables. Reasons given for these changes 
included the desire to address long-standing problems 
with the credibility of data—by creating a ‘single source 
of truth’—and the recognition by boards of the impor-
tance of monitoring quality and safety.
The data in reports were managed by hospital infor-
mation teams. Several of our interviewees commented 
on the fact that many indicators were counts—numbers 
of incidents, numbers of deaths in hospital and so on. It 
was argued that this was, in large part, because national 
bodies had long focused on activity data and accordingly 
that was the data available to hospitals. At the same time, 
the numbers of ‘narrative reports’, which combined 
routine data about a particular topic with a text commen-
tary, increased in the course of the study. For the moni-
toring of complaints, for example:
… before we didn’t really measure how quickly the 
complaints were turned around … [now] we have the 
turnaround time reported, and the themes … have 
we responded in the right way? and if not why not? … 
So that’s been a huge turnaround for us in terms of 
complaint reduction and how our teams are manag-
ing complaint responses. (Quartet quality committee 
member)
These developments were not costless. There were a 
number of comments about the time that information 
teams had to spend on verifying data and on producing 
reports. For example, considerable effort had to be 
devoted each month to the collection and collation of 
nationally mandated NHS Safety Thermometer data, 
even though much of the data were already recorded in 
patient notes and in Datix (a system used widely to record 
information about incidents). One respondent observed 
that:
… out of the twenty days in a month which a person 
works … eighteen of those days at the moment are 
about data verification … we’ve got to get that down 
to three or four days. (Duo informatics lead)
board committees: use and value of data
The data available in committee papers, both in detailed 
‘information packs’ and in papers on specific topics (eg, 
trends in mortality and initiatives to reduce the incidence 
of pressure ulcers) were used extensively throughout 
the period of observation. Quality committees used 
data for performance management, for assurance, to 
identify organisational risks and to identify opportuni-
ties for service improvement. The value of the data was 
highlighted when non-executive directors used it to chal-
lenge executives. In Solo, for example, they questioned 
the value of receiving data on serious incidents that had 
happened many months earlier and challenged ‘what we 
will do’ statements, wanting to know how improvement 
would be achieved and measured.
Data in reports were not the only source of informa-
tion to senior managers. Interviewees told us about 
additional strategies many introduced between 2014 
and 2016, for gathering intelligence. These included 
the introduction of weekly meetings where staff could 
raise any issues or concerns with the chief nurse and 
medical director. Non-executives also went on regular 
ward ‘walkabouts’:
You triangulate what you are receiving [in board re-
ports] with … what people actually say and talk about. 
(Quartet quality committee member)
Board quality committee members indicated that they 
believed that the governance of the quality and safety of 
services had improved over time. At Solo:
As a Trust now compared to where we were pre-Fran-
cis, we are in a much stronger position in terms of the 
quality and quantity of the information we get. And 
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you can always ask for more. (Solo quality committee 
member)
Similarly at Trio:
… because we’ve got access to that information, to be 
able to detect, for example, a deteriorating position 
in a ward … much more speedily … We can respond 
and put measures in place to recover that position. 
(Trio senior nurse manager)
disCussiOn
This study focused on the development of large-scale 
information infrastructures over time, casting light on 
both their implementation and use. We found that two 
distinct information structures were developing: one 
characterised by the use of real-time data and the other 
of retrospective data. The retrospective data were aggre-
gated into management reports and used in routine 
review of quality and safety; this served to rationalise the 
curation and use of hitherto disparate datasets that were 
being generated across the hospitals. The difficulties that 
Quartet faced with real-time systems remind us that these 
developments are far from straightforward.
The principal strengths of the study derive from the 
extent of the fieldwork and the use of evidence from 
three distinct sources—observations of working practices, 
interviews and document analysis. The findings comple-
ment those found in sociological studies of the work of 
board members and of clinicians with responsibility for 
quality and safety more generally.26 27 They typically have 
little to say about the information that clinicians and 
managers use, how it is produced or how they use it to 
inform their deliberations. The main weaknesses of the 
study are those usually associated with this study design; 
we could not evaluate patient outcomes, and the period 
of observation was limited, so that later developments 
could not be captured.
There were marked changes in the availability of data 
to board-level committees and to middle managers in 
the period 2013–2016. Our findings indicate that data 
on the quality and safety of services were used at all four 
hospitals. Boards that received little routine data in 2013, 
and thus had to rely on oral reports in meetings and on 
informal communications, were using data extensively to 
review performance in 2015 and 2016. This did not lead 
to the abandonment of less formal management strate-
gies: indeed, these also increased during the period of 
the study, reflecting a stronger focus on quality and safety 
within the hospitals.28
The findings serve as a corrective to the many 
negative accounts of IT-based deployments in hospi-
tals and suggest that hospitals are making two signif-
icant transitions.10 11 First, NHS hospital managers 
have long had to rely on financial and activity data. 
Since 2013, managers have increasingly had access to 
retrospective reports on a range of quality and safety 
measures as well and used them to monitor perfor-
mance. Three of the four hospitals also had extensive 
real-time data systems, providing effective day-to-day 
control of quality and safety. A number of interviewees 
stressed that they had historically encountered prob-
lems with the credibility of management data. The 
general acceptance of the accuracy of routine quality 
and safety data is therefore indicative of a sea change 
in attitudes and working practices.
Second, all four hospitals were effecting a transi-
tion in their approach to the management of clinical 
risks and hazards. Viewed in the context of Vincent 
and Amalberti’s safety framework, the hospitals are 
moving away from embracing risks—where there is 
a reliance on the judgements and coping strategies 
of individual health professionals—towards a model 
where ward teams are actively managing risks.16 We 
suggest that effective information systems are a 
prerequisite for that active management. Less posi-
tively, there was limited evidence that hospitals were 
taking steps towards Vincent and Amalberti’s third 
approach, where hospitals use data to ‘design out’ 
risks, and creating ultra-safe environments.
The question arising from the last point is: why 
were not the hospitals using data to create ultrasafe 
environments? The findings hint at a possible explana-
tion, namely that data collection is substantially deter-
mined by regulatory bodies, pursuing their purposes, 
and hospitals have limited resources to devote to data 
that they capture and use for their own purposes. 
If the latter are the key data for quality improve-
ment, hospitals’ efforts will be hampered by limited 
resources. Future research might therefore focus on 
the appropriate balance of effort devoted to capturing 
and curating management and clinical information 
and, in particular, on specifying the information that 
is needed to support quality improvement initiatives.
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